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IMAGINING HOW A COMPANY THINKS: 
WHAT IS CORPORATE CULTURE? 
 
ALICE BELCHER∗ 
 
 [Corporate responsibility for crimes that require thought, or lack of 
thought, has been the subject of much debate both in the UK and 
worldwide. This article investigates the current position in the UK, where 
a Bill is currently (October 2006) before Parliament, and briefly in 
Australia, where the law has been reformed at Commonwealth level, but 
not yet implemented in individual States. In line with developments in 
Australian and the UK law a realist rather than nominalist position is 
taken that explicitly recognises genuine corporate fault. The article looks 
forward to the cases that are likely to be brought under the “corporate 
culture” provisions. It suggests that the practical methods of providing 
evidence of corporate ‘attitudes, policies, systems or accepted practices’ 
could very well include the records of meetings, very much in line with 
the method attempted in the failed Transco prosecution in Scotland. It is 
submitted that the conceptual foundation for the realist approach is 
sound and that there are practical ways of bringing the company before 
the court. However, there are also some conceptual and practical 
difficulties to be faced. Issues identified include the question of 
responsibility for sub-cultures and the practical problem of a 
proliferation of different sorts of evidence and expert opinions that could 
be put before the courts.] 
 
I BACKGROUND 
Corporate responsibility for crimes that require thought, or lack of thought, has 
been the subject of much debate both in the UK and worldwide.1 This article  
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investigates the current position in the UK, where a Bill is currently (October 
2006)2 before Parliament, and briefly in Australia, where the law has been 
reformed at Commonwealth level, but reform has not yet been implemented in 
individual States. The purpose of the paper is to focus on the sorts of management 
activity, or inactivity, that may come before the courts either in Australia or the 
UK. In Australia ‘corporate culture’, defined as ‘an attitude, policy, rule, course 
of conduct or practice existing within the body corporate generally or in the part 
of the body corporate in which the relevant activities take place’, has been 
adopted as a key concept. In the UK, the offences of corporate manslaughter 
(England and Wales) and corporate homicide (Scotland) are likely to be based on 
the concept of ‘senior management failure’ which could be evidenced by 
‘attitudes, policies, systems or accepted practices within the organisation’ if they 
were likely to have encouraged the failure at the root of the crime. 
 
II CURRENT POSITION 
 
In July 2006 the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill was 
introduced in the UK’s Westminster Parliament and its second reading has been 
scheduled for 10 October 2006. The background to this Bill includes two failed 
prosecutions: the prosecution of P&O European Ferries (Dover) Ltd for 
manslaughter under the law of England and Wales following the sinking of the 
Herald of Free Enterprise in 1987 with the loss of 193 lives; and the prosecution 
of Transco plc for culpable homicide under the law of Scotland following a gas 
explosion which destroyed a house with the loss of 4 lives. The corporate 
manslaughter offence, which is to apply in England and Wales, is largely based 
on the recommendations of a Law Commission Report of 1996.3 The corporate 
homicide offence, which is to apply in Scotland, has a much shorter history. 
Following the failure of the Transco prosecution in 2003 the devolved Scottish 
Executive set up an expert group to address the problem of corporate liability for 
culpable homicide on the assumption that, as a matter of criminal law, the 
devolved Scottish Parliament had power to legislate. The expert group reported in 
November 2005 making a range of recommendations for Scottish legislation. The 
expert group recognised that it would, in principle, be desirable for the  
 
                                                                                                                          
more comprehensive treatment. B Clark and H Langsford, ‘A Re-birth of Corporate 
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2 Contents of the Bill is stated as at 31 October 2006 as amended in Standing Committee 
B (Commons) 
3 Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter Report No 
237 (1996) 
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approaches of the UK jurisdictions to be aligned although the existing law on 
manslaughter and culpable homicide is not aligned. However the majority felt that 
alignment should be ‘secondary to getting the law right for Scotland.’4 Also, the 
expert group felt strongly that the draft Bill for England and Wales was not an 
appropriate model for Scotland.5 Despite this, a parallel offence of corporate 
homicide was added to the legislation presented to the Westminster Parliament in 
July 2006. The Scottish Executive is continuing to maintain its devolved power to 
legislate in this area, but the Bill has gone before the Westminster Parliament 
without a Sewell motion to return devolved power from the Scottish Parliament to 
Westminster. A House of Commons Research Paper published on 6 October 
20066 states: 
 
Campaigners in Scotland have also been critical of the Government’s decision to 
extend the Bill to Scotland, where separate legislation had been proposed. The 
Government has taken this decision on the basis that the Bill is concerned with 
health and safety and with business associations, both of which are reserved 
matters under the Scotland Act 1998.7 
 
It appears, therefore, that the UK will consider corporate killing to be a health and 
safety matter solely due to the constitutional interaction between the UK 
jurisdictions, and not as a matter of principle. This is an extremely unfortunate 
outcome as much of the campaigning for the legislation has been because health 
and safety law was seen as an inappropriate way of dealing with the sorts of 
incidents to be covered by the new law. 
 
For both jurisdictions, law reform is designed to overcome the problems inherent 
in the identification doctrine. Under this doctrine, before a company can be 
convicted of manslaughter an individual who can be ‘identified as the 
embodiment of the company itself’ must be shown them self to have been guilty 
of the offence. Where there is insufficient evidence to convict the individual, the 
prosecution of the company must fail.8 The doctrine identifies the company with a 
single human being and the company’s thoughts must occur within that single 
human being. This is despite the fact that the company is explicitly recognised in 
law as being a legal, but not a natural, person and as being a person separate from  
 
                                                 
4 Scottish Executive, Corporate Homicide Expert Group Report, Edinburgh, November, 
2005, [3.1] 
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DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 11 NO 2 4 
 
its directors or shareholders. Law reform measures that recognise the special and 
different personhood of the company are therefore to be welcomed. To do this it 
is necessary to imagine an essentially collective, rather than individual, way of 
thinking. 
 
Commonwealth jurisdictions have traditionally approached corporate criminal 
responsibility using a ‘nominalist’ approach that treats the company as a 
collection of individuals and locates its criminal culpability derivatively through 
the culpability of individual actors.9  
 
The two widely accepted common law bases of corporate responsibility – 
vicarious liability (whereby the corporation is held liable for the conduct of all its 
officers, employees or agents acting within the scope of their employment or 
authority) and the ‘identification approach’ (under which the actions and mental 
state of certain individual actors are treated as the company’s own) – both 
proceed from the nominalist conception of the ‘company’ as a fiction, unable to 
be conceived as blameworthy in itself.10 
 
But critics of the nominalist approach have pointed out how it fails to fit with 
public perceptions of companies. Wells reported that ‘the relatives [of the 
deceased] were keen to see the company properly punished but not the particular 
individuals whose misfortune it was to be operating the ferry that … night.’11 It 
also fails to capture the fact that organisations such as companies function as real 
entities that are not reducible to propositions about the individuals that compose 
them. The argument of the ‘realists’ is that a company is best thought of as 
something beyond the individuals involved in it. Holistic theories have therefore 
been developed that locate genuine corporate fault in procedures, systems and 
culture of the company. It is these theories that have been given legislative force 
in Australia and are the basis of the Bill before the UK Parliament.  
 
In the Transco prosecution a preliminary diet was held in the High Court, 
Edinburgh, before Lord Carloway to consider a minute from Transco challenging 
the competency and relevancy of the charge of culpable homicide. Lord 
Carloway’s finding provides a very useful way of locating the company’s guilty 
thoughts. The relevant, rather long paragraph states: 
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Meaghan Wilkinson, ‘Corporate Criminal Liability – The Move Towards Recognising 
Genuine Corporate Fault’ (2003) 9 Canterbury Law Review 142, 142. 
10 Ibid. 
11 C Wells, ‘Manslaughter and Corporate Crime’ (1989) 138 New Law Journal 931, 931 
cited ibid 162. 
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In order to bring home guilt, the respondent [prosecution] will have to prove that 
these committees and posts, or one or more of them, or the board of directors 
acted in a grossly negligent or reckless manner. … If, on a given occasion, the 
committee or post holder knew something or did something then that knowledge, 
act or omission becomes the knowledge, act or omission of the minuters 
[Transco] as the company, since all are the knowledge, act or omission of the 
directing mind and will of the corporation. The acts of a board of directors at one 
time are the acts of the relevant company just as later or earlier acts are those of 
the same company even although the membership or the board is entirely 
different. This is not 'aggregation' or a species of vicarious responsibility but 
simply an inevitable result of the existence of the corporate veil. It may be that in 
England there is a need to identify a particular person who could, if charged, also 
have been guilty of manslaughter  … even if that is so, it is not a requirement 
under the Scots law of culpable homicide. In cases of the type under 
consideration here, the duty allegedly breached in a grossly negligent or reckless 
manner may well be owed only by the corporation and not by any individual 
person within the company structure. In that situation, there is no reason in 
principle why the corporation should not be guilty of the crime even although no 
single individual could be.12 
 
This excellent piece of reasoning was, however, rejected and overturned by the 
Court of Session which held that the charge of culpable homicide must be 
dismissed as irrelevant. The Court of Session ruling had the effect of causing the 
unsatisfactory identification principle to be established as a problem of equal 
magnitude for the jurisdictions of Scotland, and England and Wales. 
 
The Explanatory Notes to the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide 
Bill refers to only one ‘new offence’, possibly because corporate homicide was 
added rather late in the day, and the basic elements of the two offences in the Bill 
are the same. The elements are: 
 
• The organisation must owe a duty of care to the victim that is connected with 
certain things done by the organisation. … 
• The organisation must be in breach of that duty of care as a result of the way in 
which certain activities of the organisation were managed or organised by its 
senior managers. This introduces an element of ‘senior management failure’ into 
the offence …. 
• This management failure must have caused the victim's death. The usual 
principles of causation in the criminal law will apply to determine this question. 
… 
 
                                                 
12 Transco plc Minuters (appellants) v Her Majesty’s Advocate (respondent) 2004 SCCR 
1, 22 (Scotland Appeal Court, High Court of Justiciary, March 2003). 
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• The breach of duty must have been gross. … The test asks whether the conduct 
that constitutes the failure falls far below what could reasonably have been 
expected. … Clause 9 [now clause 8 of the Bill] sets out a number of factors for 
the jury to take into account when considering this issue. There is no question of 
liability where the management of an activity includes reasonable safeguards and 
a death nonetheless occurs.13 
The Explanatory Notes go on to say that senior management failure 
looks at how in practice managers organised the performance of a particular 
activity, rather than focusing on questions of individual culpability, and enables 
management conduct to be considered collectively as well as individually.’14 
The most important change in legal thinking is that this will enable management 
conduct to be considered collectively as well as individually. In Scotland, the 
expert group feared that the use of term ‘senior management’ could result in a 
return to the need to identify senior managers and thereby a return to the 
identification principle. The explicit recognition of the need to view collective as 
well as individual conduct, albeit in the Explanatory Notes, should help to prevent 
this.  The new offences are already being described in terms of ‘senior 
management failure’. So long as the emphasis  remains on ‘management’ failure 
as a failure to manage properly and does not become ‘senior management’ failure 
which could drift into meaning the failure of a senior manager, the collective 
aspect of the offences should be preserved. Also clause 8 of the Bill explicitly 
permits the jury to  
 
(3) … (a) consider the extent to which the evidence shows that there were 
attitudes, policies, systems or accepted practices within the organisation that 
were likely to have encouraged any such failure as is mentioned in subsection 
(2), or to have produced tolerance of it; [and]…  
(4) This section does not prevent the jury from having regard to any other matters 
they consider relevant. 
 
This is the place where the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill 
is closest to the framing of corporate criminal responsibility under the Australian 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth). The Australian statute provides that a company is 
responsible when a corporate culture existed within the body corporate that 
directed, encouraged, tolerated or led to non-compliance with the relevant  
 
                                                 
13 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill, Explanatory Notes, 2006, [14] 
(Eng. and Scotland) (emphasis added). 
14 Ibid [15] (emphasis added). 
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provision. ‘Corporate culture’ is defined as ‘an attitude, policy, rule, course of 
conduct or practice existing within the body corporate generally or in the part of 
the body corporate in which the relevant activities take place.’15 The relevant 
Criminal Code provisions read: 
 
12.3(1) If intention, knowledge or recklessness is a fault element in relation 
to a physical element of an offence, that fault element must be 
attributed to a body corporate that expressly, tacitly or impliedly 
authorised or permitted the commission of the offence. 
 
(2) The means by which such an authorisation or permission may be 
established include: 
 
  (a) proving that the body corporate's board of directors 
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly carried out the 
relevant conduct, or expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised 
or permitted the commission of the offence; or 
 
  (b) proving that a high managerial agent of the body corporate 
intentionally, knowingly or recklessly engaged in the 
relevant conduct, or expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised 
or permitted the commission of the offence; or 
 
  (c) proving that a corporate culture existed within the body 
corporate that directed, encouraged, tolerated or led to non-
compliance with the relevant provision; or 
 
  (d) proving that the body corporate failed to create and maintain 
a corporate culture that required compliance with the 
relevant provision.16 
 
The explanatory memorandum to this provision states that it will allow 
 
the prosecution to lead evidence that the company’s written rules tacitly 
authorised non-compliance or failed to create a culture of compliance. It would 
catch situations where, despite formal documents appearing to require 
compliance, the reality was that non-compliance was expected. For example, 
employees who know that if they do not break the law to meet production 
schedules (for example, by removing safety guards or equipment), they will be 
dismissed. The company would be guilty of intentionally breaching safety 
legislation. Similarly, the corporate culture may tacitly authorise reckless 
offending (for example, recklessly disregarding the substantial and unjustifiable  
 
                                                 
15 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) Part 2.4, s12.3(6). 
16 Ibid s 12.3 (1) and (2). 
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risk of causing serious injury by removing the equipment guards). The company 
would be guilty of a reckless endangerment offence.17 
 
In England and Wales and in Scotland the offences of corporate manslaughter and 
corporate homicide respectively will also attribute criminal responsibility to 
companies on the basis of collective management failure which can be evidenced 
by failures of corporate culture. In Australia corporate criminal responsibility has 
been codified in Commonwealth legislation, but the codified method of 
attributing criminal responsibility only applies directly to federal level crimes. In 
2004 there was a failed attempt, using a Private Member’s Bill, to create a new 
offence of industrial manslaughter in Commonwealth legislation. The position 
within individual States and territories varies. So, for instance, in the Australian 
Capital Territory the enactment of Part 2.5 of the Criminal Code Act 2002 (ACT) 
brought the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) into ACT law, but because its 
provisions did not apply to ‘pre 2003’ offences, it was also necessary to re-enact 
new manslaughter provisions.18 Other Australian States have approached the issue 
in various ways and with different degrees of success.19 No prosecutions have yet 
been reported that employ Australia’s ‘corporate culture’ provisions to attribute 
corporate criminal responsibility. 
 
III POSSIBLE EVIDENCE 
 
In order to bring a case to court based on a management failure located in 
corporate culture the prosecution will need to assemble evidence of corporate 
culture. In the failed Transco prosecution the evidence the prosecution sought to 
bring before the court was evidence from records of meetings. This could have 
been good evidence of how the company thought. Schwartzman states that 
‘meetings are significant because they are the organisation or community writ  
 
 
                                                 
17 Explanatory Memorandum to the Criminal Code Bill 1994 (Cth) para 7.126 
18 However, the same State has also enacted The Crimes (Industrial Manslaughter) 
Amendment Act 2003. The ‘employer offence’ included in this Act applies only to the 
death of an employee, and can be committed by corporate and non-corporate employer 
organisations. So, there is some confusion as to which provisions will be used in a 
prosecution. 
19 Parliament of Australia, Workplace Death and Serious Injury: A Snapshot of 
Legislative Developments in Australia and Overseas Research Brief no.7 2004–2005 
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/Pubs/rb/2004-05/05rb07.htm . The story of Victoria’s 
attempts to legislate in this area has been told by Karen Wheelwright, ‘Corporate Liability 
For Workplace Deaths And Injuries – Reflecting On Victoria’s Laws In The Light Of The 
Esso Longford Explosion’ (2002) 7 Deakin Law Review 323. 
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small’.20 Weick argues that ‘meetings define, represent, and reproduce social 
entities. … Because action that occurs in the meetings is organizational action, 
this must mean that there really is an organization. Momentarily, at least during 
the meeting, there appears to be an organization, and this appearance is 
reconstituted whenever meetings are constituted’21 and ‘meetings embody the 
organization and give it some substance.’22 It is possible to be more specific about 
the sorts of evidence on corporate culture and health and safety compliance that 
may be available by looking into the latest methods being employed in 
organisational theory, safety science, risk management and compliance programs. 
The next three sections describe and analyse the sorts of evidence that might be 
generated under the headings ‘culture and climate’, ‘culture and risk 
management’ and ‘culture and compliance programs’. 
 
 A Culture and Climate 
 
The discipline most often associated with the study of culture is, of course, 
anthropology. However, the study of attitudes and perceptions is the realm of 
social psychology. Research on ‘organisational culture’ is rooted in anthropology 
whereas research on ‘organisational climate’ has developed from a social 
psychological framework.23 There are also two very different approaches or views 
of organisational culture. These have been described as functionalist and 
interpretive. The functionalist approach sees organisational culture as something 
that can, and should, be manipulated to serve corporate interests. The interpretive 
approach sees it as something that emerges; that is not owned by any group within 
an organisation but is created by all the organisation’s members. 
 
A functionalist perspective is ‘top down’ in that it serves the strategic imperative 
of members of the controlling group. An interpretive perspective represents a 
‘bottom up’ approach, and allows for the existence of sub-cultures within an 
organisation. Most organisations display elements of both approaches.24 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 H B Schwartzman, ‘The Significance of Meetings in an American Mental Health 
Centre’ (1987) 14 American Ethnologist 271, 288. 
21 K E Weick, Sensemaking in Organizations (1995) 143. 
22 Ibid 187. 
23 W.H. Glick, ‘Conceptualizing and measuring organizational and psychological climate: 
pitfalls in multilevel research’ (1985) 10 Academy of Management Review 601. 
24 A I Glendon and N A ‘Stanton, Perspectives on Safety Culture’ (2000) 34 Safety 
Science 193, 194. 
DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 11 NO 2 10 
 
Culture can also be distinguished from climate in their timing. Whilst culture is 
often characterised as an enduring aspect of the organisation with trait-like 
properties, climate can be conceived as a ‘temporal manifestation’25 of 
organisational culture exhibiting more state-like properties.26 
 
If organisational culture has failed and a fatal accident has resulted, it is likely that 
the specific issue will narrow down from the organisation as a whole to its safety 
culture or safety climate. The relationship between these two concepts has been 
set out by Cooper who views safety culture as  
 
a product of three interrelated aspects: 
• Psychological Aspects or ‘safety climate’ (individual and group 
attitudes, perceptions and values). 
• Behavioural Aspects (safety-related actions and behaviours). 
• Situational Aspects (policies, procedures, organisational structures and 
management systems).27 
 
However, there is a longstanding debate as to the nature and supremacy and 
applicability of culture versus climate in organisational theory.28 There is also a 
relationship between organisational climate and safety climate which has been 
explained by Neal et al as follows: 
 
Perceptions of the general organizational climate develop as individuals attribute 
meaning to their organizational context based on the significance of the 
environment for individual values. Organizational climate, therefore, is thought 
to exert a strong impact on individual motivation to achieve work outcomes. 
General organizational climate has also been found to influence knowledge and 
skills by increasing participation in activities such as training. Safety climate is a  
 
 
 
                                                 
25 S J Cox and A J T Cheyne, ‘Assessing Safety Culture in Offshore Environments’ 
(2000) 34 Safety Science 111, 114.  
26 It should also be noted that this is the language of anthropology being used in the field 
of organisational theory.  Roy D’Andrade, The Development of Cognitive Anthropology 
(1995) 247 states: ‘The term trait had been strongly discredited in cultural anthropology since 
Malinowski.’ On culture generally, and what comprises it, D’Andade states that amongst 
anthropologists there is ‘a lack of conceptualization about exactly what was being studied’: Ibid 
251 
27 Health and Safety Executive, A Review of Safety Culture and Safety Climate Literature 
for the Development of the Safety Culture Inspection Toolkit (2005) Prepared by Human 
Engineering, Research Report 367 [7.2]. 
28 R Flin, K Mearns, P O'Connor and R Bryden,  ‘Measuring Safety Climate: Identifying 
the Common Features’ (2000) 34 Safety Science 177, 178. 
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specific form of organizational climate, which describes individual perceptions 
of the value of safety in the work environment.29 
 
These theoretical definitions and debates are reflected in a multitude of attempts 
to devise methods, or toolkits, to measure or assess the various concepts as they 
are exhibited in particular organisations. Flin et al have compared and reviewed a 
set of safety climate scales and conclude that:  
 
The initial reviews demonstrated that measures vary significantly in almost all 
respects: content, style, statistical analysis, sample size, sample composition 
(workers, supervisors, managers), industry and country of origin. Factor analysis 
is typically used for identification of an underlying structure but numbers of 
items range from 11 to 300 and thus solutions range from two to 19 factors. 
Drawing direct comparisons between factor labels and (loading) items across 
these measures remains problematical due not only to the methodological 
inconsistencies outlined above, but also to cultural and language differences 
across both countries and industries.30 
 
Despite, or perhaps because of, these difficulties several safety ‘toolkits’ have 
been developed. For instance, Cox and Cheyne devised a ‘safety climate toolkit’ 
for ‘offshore environments’ using multiple organisational perspectives and data 
triangulation.31 This toolkit uses approaches that are combined to provide an in-
depth picture of the organisation’s safety climate at the time of the assessment. 
 
During this process reliance is  not placed on any single form of assessment, e.g. 
questionnaires, nor is it placed on any single part of the overall system, e.g. only 
organisational systems and compliance. It builds upon a holistic approach and 
provides a ‘rich-picture’ of the overall safety climate.32 
 
The UK’s Health and Safety Executive commissioned ‘A Review of Safety 
Culture and Safety Climate Literature for the Development of the Safety Culture 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 A Neal, M A Griffin and P M Hart, ‘The Impact of Organizational Climate on Safety 
Climate and Individual Behaviour’ (2000) 34 Safety Science 99, 100. 
30 Flin et al, above n 21, 179. 
31 The seminal work on triangulation is T D Jick, ‘Mixing Qualitative Methods and 
Quantitative Methods: Triangulation in Action’ (1979) 24 Administrative Science 
Quarterly 602. 
32  S J Cox and A J T Cheyne ‘Assessing Safety Culture in Offshore Environments’ (2000) 
34 Safety Science 111, 126. Drawing on ideas in S Cox and R Flin, ‘Safety Culture: 
Philosopher's Stone or Man of Straw?’ (1998) 12 Work and Stress 189. 
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Inspection Toolkit.’ This appears to be a piece of preparatory work in the 
development of a toolkit for use by HM Railway Inspectorate. 33 For this exercise  
 
[t]he scope of the work programme is directed towards developing a tool that 
captures how a company’s safety culture is shaped by corporate practices and 
organisational behaviour, rather than focusing on the perceptions of staff. The 
Safety Culture Inspection Toolkit will thus focus on behavioural and situational 
aspects of an organisation’s safety culture.34 
 
The resulting toolkit will therefore assess two parts of safety culture, omitting 
safety climate. The report identifies five indicators upon which the toolkit is to be 
based: leadership, two-way communication, employee involvement, learning 
culture and attitude towards blame.35 A ‘vertical slice’ methodology was 
recommended because of the need to 
 
assess operational workforce, supervisory levels as well as management and 
strategic thinking in order to identify if the right information, norms and values 
are being communicated down the hierarchy, as well as there being opportunities 
for the workforce to communicate to management about health and safety 
issues.36 
 
In addition to the multitude of ways in which safety climate has been assessed 
there is also the potential for an organisation to have not only an overall culture 
but also sub-cultures at work within it. A study by McDonald et al reveals how 
this plays out in practice in the field of aviation maintenance. They found that 
whilst the organisation’s management believe that ‘the role of technicians is to 
follow the task and organisational procedures explicitly, though it is often 
acknowledged that if everyone followed procedures to the letter, production 
would be hugely delayed’, the technicians believe that they have a professional 
responsibility for the overall safety of the aircraft.37 They conclude from this that 
the organisation has a strong professional sub-culture operating within it. It is not 
clear whether a safety culture toolkit employing a ‘vertical slice’ methodology is 
capable of capturing an organisation’s sub-cultures as such even if it can indicate 
situations where the organisational norms and values are not being 
‘communicated down the hierarchy.’ A functionalist view of organisational 
culture suggests that culture is something that can be chosen and shaped by  
 
                                                 
33 Health and Safety Executive, above n 24, [7.2.2]. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid [7.2.3]. 
36 Ibid [7.2.10]. 
37 N McDonald, S Corrigan, C Daly and S Cromie, ‘Safety Management Systems and 
Safety Culture in Aircraft Maintenance Organisations’ (2000) 34 Safety Science 151, 173. 
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management. An interpretive view of organisational culture suggests that culture 
is something not under management’s control. The idea that senior management 
can know and influence corporate culture is implicit in the proposition that a 
company should be held responsible for its culture. There remains the issue of 
how far a company should be held responsible for its sub-cultures. In the example 
of the aircraft maintenance industry, the technicians’ sub-culture is one of paying 
greater attention to safety. A sub-culture will only become problematic if it 
involves paying less attention to safety and a death results. In the Australian 
context, Baxt has suggested that the requisite criminality could be attributed to a 
company as a whole ‘where one mutinous branch or subdivision was in the 
practice of engaging in unlawful conduct in defiance of corporate policy.’38 The 
Explanatory Notes to the UK Bill state that it 
 
attributes liability to the organisation only for failures in the way on 
organisation’s senior managers managed or organised an activity. This is 
intended to focus the offence on the overall way in which an activity was being 
managed or organised by an organisation and to exclude more localised or junior 
management failings as a basis for liability (although these might provide 
evidence of management failings at more senior levels).39 
 
It is submitted that the wording of the UK Bill leaves it open for a prosecutor to 
argue that a problem sub-culture provides evidence of the requisite senior 
management failure. 
 
 B Culture and risk management 
 
If companies are to be held responsible for their culture, governing that culture 
will be a part of good corporate governance. In fact, corporate governance best 
practice has already approached this issue using slightly different terminology. 
The ‘internal control’ provision of the UK’s ‘Combined Code’ states: 
 
The directors should at least annually conduct a review of the effectiveness of the 
group’s system of internal control and should report to shareholders that they 
have done so. The review should cover all controls, including financial, 
operational and compliance controls and risk management. 
                                                 
38 R Baxt, ‘Ascribing Civil and Criminal Liability for Company Employees and Directors 
— Who Carries the Corporate Can?’ Paper presented at Penalties: Policy Principles & 
Practice & Government Regulation (Sydney, 9 June 2001), 4 - cited in Australian Law 
Reform Commission, ALRC 95 Principled Regulation: Civil and Administrative Penalties 
in Australian Federal Regulation Part B Corporate Responsibity, Chapter 7 available at 
,http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/other/alrc/publications/reports/95/07.Corporate_Responsibili
ty.html#heading2>. 
39 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill, Explanatory Notes 2006 [15]. 
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Full implementation of this provision was delayed until guidance could be 
provided to directors. Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the Combined 
Code (the Turnbull guidance) was published in April 1999 and applied to all 
accounting periods ending on or after 23 December 2000. 
 
Internal control is a concept that has been defined and used routinely by company 
auditors in their work, eg in the UK Statement of Auditing Standard (SAS) 300.40 
The UK’s Code of Best Practice originated in the work of the Cadbury Committee 
on the financial aspects of corporate governance, published as the Cadbury Code 
in December 1992. Prior to Cadbury, the quality of the organisation’s internal 
control was important to those involved in drafting and auditing the annual report, 
but ‘internal control’ meant ‘internal financial control’. The internal control 
provision explicitly goes beyond the purely or directly financial. According to 
Power this provision ‘generated fundamental problems about what internal 
controls really are and what one is saying in describing them as effective.’41 
Because the non-financial (or the not-directly-financial) aspects of the provision 
were new and difficult, the initial response was to restrict its reporting impact, for 
the time being, to its financial aspect. Under the Rutteman guidance (1994), 
directors were able to restrict their confirmation of their review of effectiveness of 
the system of internal control to internal financial control.42 However, it was 
recognised that a partial implementation of the Code could only be sustained in 
the short term. Conceptually, ‘internal control’ moved beyond ‘internal financial 
control’. For instance, in a survey of large UK companies conducted in 1994/95, 
76.9% of the finance directors who responded thought that internal controls 
should not be restricted to financial controls but should be considered in their 
widest sense.43 
 
The Turnbull guidance itself emphasises the wide scope of the Code provision. It 
states: ‘[I]nternal controls considered by the board should include all types of 
controls including those of an operational and compliance nature, as well as  
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Auditing Practices Board, Statement of Auditing Standard (SAS) 300 Accounting and 
internal control systems and audit risk assessments (1995). 
41 M Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification (1997) 55. 
42 Rutteman Working Group, Internal Control and Financial Reporting – Guidance for 
Directors of Listed Companies Registered in the UK (1994) (known as ‘the Rutteman 
guidance’). 
43 R.W. Mills, ‘Internal Control Practices within Large UK Companies’ in K Keasey and 
M Wright (eds), Corporate Governance: Responsibilities, Risks and Remuneration  
(1997). 
2006 Imagining How a Company Thinks 15 
 
internal financial controls.’44 The significant issue for the Turnbull working party 
was not whether, but how directors were to deal with the whole of the internal 
control provision of the Code, and in particular the issue of effectiveness. The 
answer they have provided is a ‘risk-based approach’. The Turnbull guidance 
states: 
  
A company’s objectives, its internal organisation and the environment in which it 
operates are continually evolving and, as a result, the risks it faces are continually 
changing. A sound system of internal control therefore depends on a thorough 
and regular evaluation of the nature and extent of the risks to which the company 
is exposed. Since profits are, in part, the reward for successful risk-taking in 
business, the purpose of internal control is to help manage and control risk 
appropriately rather than eliminate it.45  
 
The Turnbull guidance also states that: ‘Significant risks may, for example, 
include those related to market, credit, liquidity, technological, legal, health, 
safety and environmental, reputation, and business probity issues.’46 The specific 
risks related to corporate killing therefore come under the ambit of the Turnbull 
guidance.47 The risk that the company’s operations will kill one of its employees 
or a member of the public could be classified as a health, safety or environmental 
risk. The risk that the company will be convicted of corporate killing could be a 
legal or reputation risk. Poor reputation was one of the significant risks identified 
in a Deloitte & Touche survey reported in Implementing Turnbull: a boardroom 
briefing.48  
 
In order to implement the Turnbull guidance, UK listed companies have had to 
work out what the application of a risk-based approach means, and its limitations. 
Across companies, the answers may be different: Turnbull states that each board 
must ‘ensure that the system of internal control is effective in managing risks in 
the manner which it has approved.’49 The guidance itself is ‘based on the 
adoption by a company’s board of a risk-based approach to establishing a sound 
system of internal control and reviewing its effectiveness.50 This involves the 
identification and prioritising of risks and embedding the risk management  
 
                                                 
44 The Turnbull Working Party, Internal Control: Guidance for Directors on the 
Combined Code (1999) (known as ‘the Turnbull guidance’) [28]. 
45 Ibid [13]. 
46 Ibid Appendix. 
47 Alice Belcher, ‘Corporate Killing as a Corporate Governance Issue’ (2002) 10 
Corporate Governance: An International Review 47. 
48 M E Jones and G Sutherland, Implementing Turnbull: A Boardroom Briefing (1999) 14. 
49 Turnbull, above n 44 [16] (emphasis added).  
50 Ibid [9]. 
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approach in the culture and processes of the business. The process envisaged by 
Turnbull is that the board should, in the light of the company’s business 
objectives, set policies on internal control by considering 
 
the nature and extent of the risks facing the company; the extent and categories 
of risk which it regards as acceptable for the company to bear; the likelihood of 
the risks concerned materialising; the company’s ability to reduce the incidence 
and impact on the business of risks that do materialise; and the costs of operating 
particular controls relative to the benefit thereby obtained in managing the related 
risks.51 
 
Management should implement these policies, but all employees are seen as 
having some responsibility for internal control as part of their accountability for 
achieving objectives. Boards should ask: ‘Does the company communicate to its 
employees what is expected of them and the scope of their freedom to act?’52 The 
process of changing behaviour at all levels of the company is described as 
‘embedding’ the implementation of Turnbull. From this it can be seen that good 
corporate governance now involves having risk management policies and 
embedding these policies in behaviour. This maps onto two of the three aspects in 
Cooper’s definition of culture: the situational and behavioural aspects. It also 
maps onto two of the elements that a jury may consider under clause 8 of the 
UK’s Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill: policies and 
accepted practices. In order for a board to achieve compliance with the current 
version of the Code of Best Practice it will have to agree a risk management 
policy and be assured, through the papers presented to it and the asking of 
questions, that the policies are being carried through into behaviour. The relevant 
papers and board minutes may not, however, use the terminology of ‘safety 
culture’ if they are presented as part of compliance with corporate governance 
best practice. 
 
However, a risk-management approach is not in itself a guarantee that accidents 
or disaster will be avoided. Risk management has the appearance of being 
scientific. The very exercise of identifying and assessing or categorising corporate 
risks may give the whole process a spurious feeling of certainty and scientific 
validity. It should be remembered that the identification and assessment of risks 
will be subjective and there is evidence that individuals treat risks differently 
depending on how they frame situations. The concept of framing was discussed  
 
 
 
                                                 
51 Ibid [17].  
52 Ibid  Appendix. 
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by Kahnemen and Tversky53 and later by Bazerman54 and Thaller.55 The risks of 
sailing with the bow doors open were, according to the Sheen Report,56 not 
obvious to crews of car ferries before the Zeebrugge disaster. The issue appears 
not to have been framed in terms of putting to sea with a large hole in the hull. 
The implementation of a risk-based approach at P&O European Ferries may not 
have identified the risk of the disaster that actually happened because the safety 
issue may not have been framed so as to capture that risk. Institutionalised 
assumptions and norms that have the capacity to simultaneously illuminate some 
hazards while shifting attention away from others have been described as a 
‘fundamental paradox’ of organizational safety culture.’57 ‘Avoiding disaster 
therefore involves an element of thinking both within administratively defined 
frames of reference (to deal with well-defined hazards that fall within an 
organization's prior worldview) and simultaneously stepping outside of those 
frames (to at least consider the possibility of emergent or ill-defined hazards that 
have not been identified in advance (or which perhaps fall outside of an 
organization's strict administrative or legal remit).’58 Putting the Turnbull 
guidance into practice will not necessarily mean that organisational procedures 
will ‘step outside’ the administratively defined frames of reference. It is more 
likely that formalising risk management activities in the matrix form suggested 
under Turnbull will reinforce the ‘administratively defined frames’. 
 
 C Culture and compliance programs 
 
The Australian formula assigning liability to companies on the basis of corporate 
culture has been on the statute book long enough for discussion by commentators 
to have worked through some of its implications. Baxt has argued that it is a 
formula that can be read as giving legislative force to the emphasis placed on the 
development and implementation of legal compliance programs.59 This is based 
on section 12.3(2)(d) where responsibility is based on ‘proving that the body  
 
                                                 
53D Kahnemen and A Tversky, ‘Subjective Probability: A Judgement of 
Representativeness’ (1972) 3 Cognitive Psychology 430. 
54 M H  Bazerman ‘The Relevance of Kahneman and Tversky’s Concept of Framing to 
Organisation Behaviour’ (1984) 10 Journal of Management 333. 
55 R Thaller, ‘Toward a Positive Theory of Consumer Choice’ (1980) 1 Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 39. 
56 Department of Transport (UK), MV Herald of Free Enterprise Report No 8974 (the 
Sheen Report) (1987). 
57 N Pidgeon and M O'Leary, ‘Man-made Disasters: Why Technology and Organizations 
(Sometimes) Fail (2000) 34 Safety Science 15, 22 referring to N F Pidgeon, ‘Safety 
Culture: Key Theoretical Issues’ (1998) 12 Work and Stress 202. 
58 Ibid. 
59 R Baxt, above n 38.  
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corporate failed to create and maintain a corporate culture that required 
compliance with the relevant provision.’ It should be noted, however, that this 
does not require the organisation to have a ‘compliance program’ as such. The 
provisions in the UK Bill are even less specific on ‘compliance’. Companies can 
be held responsible based on evidence that attitudes, policies, systems or accepted 
practices within the organisation were likely to have to have ‘produced tolerance 
of’ the non-compliance at the root of the crime. In general, the term ‘compliance 
program’ is used to refer to a scheme initiated by an organisation in an attempt to 
ensure its compliance with relevant legislation and regulations. It typically 
includes a range of measures including education and training of all company 
employees; advice to the company’s agents or subcontractors where applicable; 
documentation of checks that give management assurance of compliance; and 
encouragement of employee participation, potentially involving methods for easy 
communication and whistleblowing. In the Australian context, compliance 
programs have also been used as ‘enforceable undertakings’ which are a relatively 
new form of agreed remedy made available to the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission (ACCC) and the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC).60 A remedy of this sort agreed between the regulator and 
regulated can be very general and can go beyond the particular sections that have 
been contravened. However, if a case comes before a court, the power to order a 
compliance program will depend on the particular remedies available for the 
specific regulatory breach and a general compliance program will usually be 
beyond the court’s power.61 In Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission v Real Estate Institute of Western Australia Incorporated French J 
said: 
 
There was within the ACCC submission in this case a thread of reasoning that 
seemed to suggest broad compliance programs could be ordered because of their 
general beneficial effects. It may be accepted without reservation that corporate 
education in trade practices through wide ranging compliance programs and the 
fostering of a culture of compliance is good. That does not mean it is appropriate 
for the Court bounteously to impose the full measure of that good upon a 
contravener.62 
 
 
 
                                                 
60 See Christine Parker, ‘Restorative Justice in Business Regulation? The Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission's Use of Enforceable Undertakings’ (2004) 67 
Modern Law Review 209. 
61 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Z-Tec Computer Pty Ltd (1997) 
ATPR 44. 
62 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Real Estate Institute of Western 
Australia Inc (1999) ATPR 41-673 at 42,606. 
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In the context of the UK Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill 
the remedies available to a court will include remedial orders, but limited to steps 
to remedy the breach itself and ‘any matter that appears to the court to have 
resulted from that breach and to have been a cause of the death.’63 It will be for 
the prosecution to make an application for such an order. 
 
It is also important to note that the claim that Australia’s statute ‘gives legislative 
force to legal compliance programs’ is different in nature from the claim made in 
the previous section on culture and risk management. The onus placed on the 
board if it wants to comply with the internal control provision of the Code of Best 
Practice is to have a risk-management policy and to embed that policy in 
behaviour throughout the company. However, the question of what the company’s 
attitude to risk should be is not specified. In respect of health and safety law the 
range of possible attitudes to risk is dealt with, after the fact, in the courts. So in 
the UK under section 2(1) of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 employers 
have a duty to ensure, so far as reasonably practicable, the health, safety and 
welfare at work of all their employees. This overriding duty has a moral content; 
it is wrong to harm your workers. But an employing company can choose to put 
their workers at risk and take the consequences of that risk-taking choice. In R v 
Howe (Engineers) Ltd,64 the Court of Appeal held that the level of fines imposed 
generally for health and safety offences is too low, that fines need to be large 
enough to bring home the health and safety message ‘not only to the company but 
also to its shareholders.’ Also in assessing the appropriate fine: 
 
Particular aggravating features will include (1) a failure to heed warnings and (2) 
where the defendant has deliberately profited financially from a failure to take 
necessary health and safety steps, or specifically run a risk to save money.65 
 
This set of principles applies in situations where, and after, a breach of duty has 
been established, but it is clear that it is intended to also feed into the cost benefit 
analysis that is envisaged as part of the implementation of Turnbull. However, it 
does not mean that the result of a particular company’s analysis of its expected 
costs and benefits will produce a decision to spend money moving from a position 
where it is breach of duty to a position of full compliance with the law. 
 
The nature of the linkage between the company’s responsibility for the results of 
its corporate culture and the obligation to institute ‘compliance programs’ is also 
far from clear cut. There is a gap between generalised pronouncements of ‘best  
 
                                                 
63 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill, clause 10. 
64 [1999] IRLR 434 (Eng. C.A. 1999) 
65 Ibid 437. 
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practice’ or ‘good practice’ and practice that is poor enough to constitute a breach 
of duty. In this gap is actual practice that, although it falls below the aspirational 
standard, does not fall far enough to constitute a breach of duty. This gap can 
occur in any area where ‘best practice’ has been set out, for instance health and 
safety or accident prevention, or corporate governance more generally. The UK 
courts have yet to pronounce explicitly on the interaction of corporate governance 
best practices and directors’ duties. However, such a case has reached the 
Delaware Supreme Court: In re The Walt Disney Company Derivative 
Litigation.66 The facts were, briefly, that Disney’s CEO, Eisner, lured Ovitz, his 
long-time friend, to Disney as president and his presumed successor. Disney's 
board compensation committee approved a pay package for Ovitz without 
understanding all of its details and implications. Almost immediately after his 
hiring, other Disney senior executives opposed Ovitz and soon Eisner perceived 
that his friend did not fit into the company's culture. Ovitz was terminated (not for 
cause) a little over a year after his hiring and paid the contractually agreed, 
enormous, severance award. The Delaware Supreme Court compared the ‘best 
practice’ approach to Ovitz’s hiring with the approach that Disney’s 
compensation committee actually took and held that: 
 
Regrettably, the committee’s informational and decision-making process used 
here was not so tidy. That is one reason why the Chancellor found that although 
the committee’s process did not fall below the level required for a proper 
exercise of due care, it did fall short of what best practices would have 
counselled. 
 
All aspects of the Chancery Court’s decision were approved by the Supreme 
Court. The Chancellor had also stated that: 
 
the development of aspirational ideals, however worthy as goals for human 
behaviour, should not work to distort the legal requirements by which human 
behaviour is actually measured.67 
 
                                                 
66 No. 15452 (US, Supreme Court, Delaware, June 8, 2006). 
67 Another issue raised before the Delaware Supreme Court was whether responsibility for 
a breach of directors’ duties should be established by looking at the conduct of each 
individual director in turn, or by looking at the conduct of the board collectively. In the 
end this issue was not addressed as it was not considered a valid ground for the appeal. 
The UK position is that: ‘Directors have, both collectively and individually, a continuing 
duty to acquire and maintain a sufficient knowledge and understanding of the company’s 
business to enable them properly to discharge their duties as directors.’ (Re Barings plc 
(No. 5) [2000] 1 BCLC 523, 535 (emphasis added). This is another area where the law 
needs to grapple with the idea of collective rather than individual responsibility. 
 
2006 Imagining How a Company Thinks 21 
 
Corporate responsibility for failing to create and maintain a corporate culture that 
requires compliance with the relevant provision (Australia), or for producing 
tolerance of the non-compliance (UK), is likely to encourage companies to 
institute compliance programs and to give them importance. However, the use of 
a general compliance program as a remedy in a corporate killing offence will 
usually be beyond the power of the court. 
 
IV CONCLUSIONS 
 
This article has, from the outset, taken a realist rather than nominalist position on 
corporate criminal responsibility. This is in line with developments in Australian 
and the UK law that explicitly recognise genuine corporate fault. The article looks 
forward to the cases that are likely to be brought under the ‘corporate culture’ 
provisions. It suggests that the practical methods of providing evidence of 
corporate ‘attitudes, policies, systems or accepted practices’ could very well 
include the records of meetings, very much in line with the method attempted in 
the failed Transco prosecution in Scotland. It is submitted that the conceptual 
foundation for the realist approach is sound and that there are practical ways of 
bringing the company before the court. However, there are also some conceptual 
and practical difficulties to be faced. One conceptual issue concerns the 
functionalist approach to corporate culture that is implicit in the statutes and, in 
particular, the question of responsibility for sub-cultures. A major practical 
problem may be the many different sorts of evidence that could be put before the 
courts and the number of expert opinions that might be presented by both 
prosecution and defence. For the UK there is also a problem with the level at 
which responsibility kicks in. The test is whether the conduct that constitutes the 
failure falls far below what could reasonably have been expected. Whilst the 
recognition of genuine corporate fault is to be welcomed, convictions may remain 
illusive. An accused company may be able to argue that the conduct was part of a 
maverick sub-culture, that the company’s culture was in fact adequate as assessed 
in various complicated ways even if it did not match aspirational ‘best practice’, 
and finally that even if the conduct was below a reasonable (rather than 
aspirational) standard, it was not far below what could reasonably have been 
expected. 
 
 
